Godel only engaged in this sort of theme because of Leibniz (proving the existence of God).
Leibniz calls this a proof of a necessary
being, not a proof of God, but everyone else calls this a proof of God.
If a necessary being is possible, it
actually exists.
Necessary being?
Who says that this is possible, and why do they say that?
Then how is it that we go from possible to actually
exists?
Perhaps it exists as an idea (like at least or something)?
For let us suppose it
does not exist - from that I shall argue like this:
A necessary being does not exist, by the hypothesis.
Whatever does not exist can possibly not exist.
A necessary being does not exist, by the hypothesis.
Whatever does not exist can possibly not exist.
If something is true, then it is also possibly true.
It is falsely
said of whatever can possibly not exist that it cannot not-exist.
What?
We can accept the first direction, right? We here talk about
the direction if something is true, then it is possibly true.
However, we cannot accept the second: If
something is possibly true, then it is true does not look like a correct
assumption.
This is not an acceptable move.
Therefore it looks correct asserting that this is false, and then it is falsely said of whatever can possibly not exist that it cannot not-exist.
This is not an acceptable move.
Therefore it looks correct asserting that this is false, and then it is falsely said of whatever can possibly not exist that it cannot not-exist.
Of whatever it is
falsely said that it cannot not-exist, it is falsely said that it is necessary.
Sure.
If it is false that something cannot not-exist, then it must be because it can not-exist, what makes of the thing something not necessary (even though we are not seeing the purpose it serves, like necessary for what?
For as long as we do not see the purpose of the thing, we cannot sign under the logic involved). It may be that we need something and we die because the thing does not exist, so that its non-existence is allowed, yet it is necessary, what does not make it false that it is necessary.
Call the following line (W).
If it is false that something cannot not-exist, then it must be because it can not-exist, what makes of the thing something not necessary (even though we are not seeing the purpose it serves, like necessary for what?
For as long as we do not see the purpose of the thing, we cannot sign under the logic involved). It may be that we need something and we die because the thing does not exist, so that its non-existence is allowed, yet it is necessary, what does not make it false that it is necessary.
Call the following line (W).
For necessary is
that which cannot not-exist.
Not really. We have just proven that it is all
context-dependent.
Therefore it is
falsely said that a necessary being is necessary.
(?) Now we do not see any connection between what is said
before this sentence and this sentence (because of (W))… .
This
conclusion is either true or false.
This is not a conclusion, therefore it is a false
conclusion.
If it
is true, it follows that a necessary being implies contradiction, or is
impossible, because contradictory things are demonstrated of it, namely that it
is not necessary. For a contradictory conclusion can be shown only when a thing
implies contradiction.
If a conclusion is false, and we do not see a contradiction,
then the argument is not something we can judge based on our logical
inferences.
If the conclusion is false, it
is necessary that something is wrong with the premises.
No, it is not. We may simply have drawn wrong inferences,
as it is clearly the case.
Yet the hypothesis can only be
false because of the premises, namely that a necessary being does not exist.
Once more, this is not really the case.
Therefore we have
concluded that a necessary being is either impossible or exists.
No, we have not.
Therefore
if we define God as ens a se [being
from itself], or as a being from whose essence existence follows, or as a
necessary being, it follows that if God is possible he actually exists.
No, nothing like that.
We do understand, however, that if a necessary being is that whose essence existence follows, then it has to exist when it is necessary.
If words from the lexicon are used to prove our points in Logic, that will confuse people.
Besides, that is a rule for Logic: we perform extraordinary effort to have words that allow for just one sense being inserted in the mathematical/logical universe, not mattering if we have to create them or not.
If he defines a necessary being as something that exists, then we do not have any inference there.
It is all improper language.
Perhaps we could make Leibniz's argument be a lot shorter following what we are learning now: God is a being whose essence implies existence. Because we think that we know His essence (therefore it does exist), we have to acknowledge His existence.
Once more, we would have problems here with Leibniz's reasoning, but way fewer problems than before. Why could God not be only essence, like without existence? What is existence and what is essence?
It is quite a shock learning that a mathematician of so much value, creator of our Calculus (http://www.storyofmathematics.com/17th_leibniz.html), has so many problems with either the figure of God (and that is why he cannot reason well when trying to write about this topic) or Classical Logic when the context is not one that belongs to Pure Mathematics (yet it should not be tried in any other context).
The proof above is not the same we see described by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, however.
We do understand, however, that if a necessary being is that whose essence existence follows, then it has to exist when it is necessary.
If words from the lexicon are used to prove our points in Logic, that will confuse people.
Besides, that is a rule for Logic: we perform extraordinary effort to have words that allow for just one sense being inserted in the mathematical/logical universe, not mattering if we have to create them or not.
If he defines a necessary being as something that exists, then we do not have any inference there.
It is all improper language.
Perhaps we could make Leibniz's argument be a lot shorter following what we are learning now: God is a being whose essence implies existence. Because we think that we know His essence (therefore it does exist), we have to acknowledge His existence.
Once more, we would have problems here with Leibniz's reasoning, but way fewer problems than before. Why could God not be only essence, like without existence? What is existence and what is essence?
It is quite a shock learning that a mathematician of so much value, creator of our Calculus (http://www.storyofmathematics.com/17th_leibniz.html), has so many problems with either the figure of God (and that is why he cannot reason well when trying to write about this topic) or Classical Logic when the context is not one that belongs to Pure Mathematics (yet it should not be tried in any other context).
The proof above is not the same we see described by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, however.
(1)
|
God is a being having all perfections. (Definition)
|
(2)
|
A perfection is a
simple and absolute property. (Definition)
|
(3)
|
Existence is a
perfection.
|
(4)
|
If existence is part
of the essence of a thing, then it is a necessary being.
|
(5)
|
If it is possible for
a necessary being to exist, then a necessary being does exist.
|
(6)
|
It is possible for a
being to have all perfections.
|
(7)
|
Therefore, a
necessary being (God) does exist.
|
The premise number (2) is already a bit controversial: perfection is an absolute property.
Perfection is a personal concept, ultra personal, instead.
In the end of 2001, we thought that Tom Cruise was absolutely perfect (just like ourselves, by the way). Would we not find people on earth to say that his nose is too big, or that he is too short, or that he is promiscuous, or that he is homosexual, or that he is a drug addict, or a coward, or a criminal, and others, like all depending on their personal experience with Tom Cruise, and their own concept of perfection?
How come this is an absolute property then? It is a super relative one instead.
Simple property? Joking! Perfection is a
complex property.
What sort of definition of simple are we considering?
If we ourselves think that someone is perfect, we are thinking of morality, physicality, partnership, virility, and things like that.
Is that simple?
A person must have almost all qualities that we can think of, if not all of them, for us to think that they are perfect.
That has to be super complex, not simple.
What sort of definition of simple are we considering?
If we ourselves think that someone is perfect, we are thinking of morality, physicality, partnership, virility, and things like that.
Is that simple?
A person must have almost all qualities that we can think of, if not all of them, for us to think that they are perfect.
That has to be super complex, not simple.
Existence is a perfection? It just gets worse!
If we are suffering violation of human rights, especially of
the most serious type, such as slavery, brainwashing, or torture, how come we
would not think, probably for the entire amount of time in which we are in that
situation, that human existence is absolutely imperfect, like it is something
absolutely undesirable.
If we have spiritual beliefs, then we would think that we are losing because of being alive, and we would not have lost had we not been born, so that this is an absolute imperfection, rather than just an imperfection.
If we have spiritual beliefs, then we would think that we are losing because of being alive, and we would not have lost had we not been born, so that this is an absolute imperfection, rather than just an imperfection.
Since we cannot really believe that (2) is a rational
move (one step is enough), this is not a proof of anything (therefore this is not a proof of the existence of God, and this is also not a proof of the existence of a necessary being).
(Poor Leibniz?)
No comments:
Post a Comment